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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider cost sharing problems arising from standard fixed tree
enterprises.1 . There is a fixed and finite set of agents who are connected to a source
through a fixed tree network. We seek to allocate the cost of this tree for cases
where the connections within the network is costly. Many real-life situations can
be modelled to fit in this general setting. For instance, consider the problem of
allocating the maintenance cost of an irrigation network or a cablevision network,
setting airport taxes for planes or setting dredging fees for ships. In a natural way
each standard fixed tree problem gives rise to a standard fixed tree game, which
relates each coalition of agents /players to the minimal expenses for connecting all
its members to the source. This makes it possible to investigate this type of prob-
lems with techniques from cooperative game theory. Extensive study for essentially
the same type of situations has resulted in a long list of papers (see Bird (1976),
Claus and Granot (1976 ), Megiddo (1978), Galil (1980), Granot and Huberman
(1981), (1984), Granot and Granot (1992), Granot and Maschler (1994), Granot et
al. (1995), Maschler et al (1995)). The special case when the underlying structure of
the game is a chain, is also known as the airport problem and considered by several
authors (Littlechild (1974), Littlechild and Owen (1977), Littlechild and Thompson
(1977), Dubey (1982), Sudhölter and Potters (1995), Aadland and Kolpin (1997)).
We are concerned with the core of the standard fixed tree game. It is a well
known fact that the game under consideration is concave. The importance of this
aspect and the implications of the tree structure become clear in Section 3, where
we characterize the core in three ways and investigate its geometrical structure. As
is known for concave games in general, the core is large and coincides with the
set of weighted Shapley values (Monderer et al. (1992)). Similar to this result, in
Section 4 we show that the core of the standard fixed tree game equals the set of
weighted constrained egalitarian allocations. Here, a weighted constrained egali-
tarian allocation is the weighted adaptation of the constrained egalitarian solution
of Dutta and Ray (1989), incorporating exogeneously given information about the
impact of the individual players that is summarized by a vector of weights. In a
way that is very natural, but particular to this model, weighted Shapley values and
weighted constrained egalitarian allocations are duals of each other. We show that
both sets of allocations can be seen as the result of a dynamical process of locally
distributing the costs of the arcs forming the tree. While a weighted Shapley value
is a down-home allocation in the sense that it is determined by splitting incremental
1Here we adopt the terminology as in Maschler et al. (1995)
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costs from the source to the leafs (Section 6), a weighted constrained egalitarian
allocation is of home-down type, splitting the incremental costs from the leafs to
the source (Section 4). The above terminology is inspired by the painting story in
Maschler et al. (1995), which describes a dynamic process of the distribution of
costs. Monotonicity properties for both above mentioned classes of solutions can
be obtained easily from this dynamic approach. In Section 5 we provide two char-
acterizations for the constrained egalitarian solution as a cost sharing mechanism. It
is shown that among the class of cost monotonic mechanisms sharing the core prop-
erty it is, on one hand, the only mechanism that minimizes the range of cost shares,
and, on the other hand, the only mechanism that maximizes Rawlsian welfare. A
discussion of analogies of these results for weighted constrained egalitarian cost
sharing mechanisms is postponed till the Appendix. But first, in Section 2 we will
formally define the standard fixed tree problem, its game and introduce necessary
notations.
2 The fixed tree connection problem: the model and
its game
In this paper we consider a fixed tree connection problem G := 〈G, c,N〉 . Here
G = (V,E) is a tree, i.e. a directed connected graph without cycles, with vertex
set V and arc set E. The set V contains a vertex which has a special meaning. We
denote this vertex by r and refer to it as the source. The function c : E → IR+, called
cost function, associates with each arc e a cost c(e). It can be interpreted as the cost
to maintain e. At each vertex there is exactly one player, the finite set of all players is
denoted by N = {1, . . . , n}. The objective of the players is to maintain sufficiently
many arcs such that by the corresponding network each finds himself connected to
the source. We assume for simplicity that the source is not occupied and that only
one arc leaves the source. Then G is referred to as simply a maintenance problem
. In the sequel we identify vertices with players (V = N ∪ {r}). For each vertex
i ∈ N there is a unique path from the source to vertex i. If that path, which we
denote by P (i), consists of the points j0 = r, j1 , . . . , jq = i , then jq−1 is called
the predecessor π(i) of vertex i. We denote by ei the arc (π(i), i). The precedence
relation (V,) on the set of vertices and/or players is defined by i  j if and only
if i ∈ P (j) . Analogously we define the precedence relation (E,) on the arcs. In
this way, the arcs are considered to be directed away from the source. A trunk of
G = (V,E) is a set of vertices T ⊆ N , which is closed under the precedence relation
defined above, i.e. if i ∈ T and j  i , then j ∈ T . An outgoing arc for a trunk
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T is an element ei = (π(i), i) ∈ E such that π(i) ∈ T but i 6∈ T . The followers of
a vertex i constitute the set F (i) = {j ∈ N | i  j}. A vertex i is called a leaf if
F (i) = {i}. With each maintenance problemG = 〈G, c,N〉 can be associated a cost
game (N, cG), where the cost cG(S) of each coalition S is defined as the minimal





c(ei) for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N (1)
where TS = {i ∈ N | ∃ j ∈ S with i  j}, and cG(∅) = 0. TS is the smallest
trunk containing S.
Remark The previous definition is similar to that of the standard tree enterprise
in Granot et al. (1996), only in their model they permit a vertex being occupied
by more than one player. However, our results can be generalized to this kind of
situations. Also the assumption that the source is not occupied, can be relaxed. As
Granot et al. (1996) pointed out, we can always add a zero-cost arc from a new
unoccupied source to the original source without changing the associated cost game.
Also the requirement that there is only one arc leaving the source is not essential for
any of our results.2
Granot et al. (1996) prove that the cost game associated to a maintenance problem
is concave. This result also follows from the next proposition which deals with the
representation of the cost game with respect to the basis {(N, u∗S)}S⊆N of the duals




1 if S ∩ T 6= ∅
0 otherwise.
2Suppose that more than one arc leaves the source. In the obvious way we define the associated cost
game cG. Then cG can be decomposed (Shapley (1971)) into p ≥ 2 components, each component
being itself a maintenance problem . That is, there exists a partition {N1, . . . , Np} of N into p
nonempty subsets such that cG(S) = cG(S∩N1)+ . . .+cG(S∩Np) for all S ⊆ N . The restrictions
of cG to each element of the partition are called components and they correspond to the various
subtrees emanating from the source. The solution concepts of our concern are consistent in the sense
that the restriction to each coalitionNj of the solution forN equals the solution for the corresponding
component. For instance, it is verified (Shapley (1971), Granot and Huberman (1981)) that the core
of the game cG, formally defined at the beginning of the next section, is simply the Cartesian product
of the cores of the various components.
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Proposition 2.1 Let G = 〈G, c,N〉 be a maintenance problem . Then the associated







where F (i) is the set of followers of vertex i in the tree G.
Proof Let S be a nonempty coalition. It follows from expression (1) that S has
to pay the cost of arc ei inE if and only if there is a player j inS such that j ∈ F (i).2
3 The core of a standard fixed tree connection prob-
lem
The problem we are concerned with is, given a maintenance problem G = 〈G, c,N〉,
to divide the construction cost of the tree cG(N) among the players. A vector of cost
shares is by definition a vector x ∈ IRN which is efficient, i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi = cG(N).
Here xi represents the amount player i has to pay according to x. The core of a cost












If x ∈ core(k), then no coalition S has an incentive to split off if x is the proposed
vector of cost shares. The purpose of this section is to determine the structure of
the core of the cost game corresponding to a maintenance problem . The first part
of the section deals with alternative expressions of the core, while the last part is
devoted to its geometric properties. There is an easy way to characterize the core of
the game (N, cG). We show that the core consists of all those allocations according
to which each agent has to make at least a zero contribution and for which the core
inequalities are met for those coalitions being trunks. For convenience, we first
introduce some additional notations. For any vector x ∈ IRN+ we denote
∑
i∈S xi by
x(S) for all S ⊆ N . In the same fashion, let c(S) :=
∑
i∈S c(ei) for all S ⊆ N .
Proposition 3.1 Let x be a vector of cost shares. Then x is a core element if and
only if x ≥ 0 and x(T ) ≤ c(T ) for each trunk T .
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Proof Trivially, if x ∈ core(cG) , then x ≥ 0 and x(T ) ≤ c(T ) for each trunk T .
Conversely, let x be a nonnegative vector of cost shares such that x(T ) ≤ c(T ) for
each trunk T . Let S ⊆ N be a nonempty coalition. Then S ⊆ TS and therefore,
according to (1), it holds cG(S) = c(TS) ≥ x(TS) ≥ x(S). 2
Let e = (i, j) be an arc ofG, we denote byBe = (Ve, Ee) the subtree of G generated
by the set F (j)∪{i} of followers of j together with vertex i . Be will be referred to
as the branch rooted at e3. Then, the previous proposition can be rewritten in terms
of the amount players outside a trunk have to pay, under a core element, as follows.
Proposition 3.2 Let x be a vector of cost shares. Then x is a core element if and







where Be = (Ve, Ee) is the branch rooted at e.
Proof The complement in V of Ve\{i} is a trunk. Therefore the result follows from
efficiency and the application of the previous proposition. 2
Remark The ‘if’ part of the above proposition appeared in fact in Granot et al.
(1996).
The next proposition shows that every core element is obtained by means of splitting,
arbitrarily, the cost of each arc among its users.
Proposition 3.3 The vector x is a core element if and only if there exist y1, . . . , yn




yji c(ej) for all i ∈ N. (4)
Proof The core is additive on the cone of concave games (Dragan, Potters and Tijs,
1989). We will give a short outline of the proof. LetGN be the class of TU games with
player setN . First, for all v, w ∈ GN it holds that core(v)+core(w) ⊆ core(v+w).
The Weber set W (v) for v ∈ GN is the convex hull of the |N |! marginal vectors of
v. W is subadditive as a multifunction, i.e. W (v + w) ⊆ W (v) + W (w) for all
3According to the terminology introduced in Granot et al., Be is the branch at i in the direction
of j if e = (i, j)
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v, w ∈ GN . Furthermore on the class of concave games the Weber set and the core
coincide (see Driessen (1988) or Ichiishi (1981)). So if v, w ∈ GN are concave we
also have the reversed inclusion, core(v + w) = W (v + w) ⊆ W (v) + W (w) =
core(v) + core(w), and consequently core(v + w) = core(v) + core(w).
All the elements of the basis {(N, u∗S)}S⊆N are concave, therefore it follows from the








Since core(u∗F (j)) is the unit simplex in IR
F (j), we are done. 2
The following results show that every core element of a maintenance problem can be
obtained by means of a partition of the original problem into various subproblems,
each one of them being itself a maintenance problem . Conversely, at each core
element x there is a unique finest partition S(x) into subproblems such that the
restriction of x to each subproblem is a core element of the corresponding game.
First we will formalize the notion of a subproblem.
Definition Let G be a tree. A subtree G′ = (V ′, E′) is rooted at r′ ∈ V ′ if
(i) r′ is the minimal element in V ′ w.r.t. 
(ii) there is exactly one vertex in V ′ that has r′ as predecessor.
We stress that, contrary to the usual terminology, the above definition of a subtree
is nonstandard. According to our definition a subtree need not contain any leaf of
the original tree whatsoever.
Definition A subtreeG′ = (V ′, E′) ofG rooted at r′ defines a restricted connection
problem G ′ = 〈G′, c′, N ′〉where c′ is the restriction of c toE′ andN ′ = V ′\{r′}.
Definition Let S = 〈G1, . . .Gp〉 be an ordered collection of subtrees of G. Then, S
is said to be a partition of G into subtrees if and only if the following conditions
hold:
(i) For all k = 1, . . . , p, there exists rk ∈ V and Ek ⊆ E such that
Gk = (Sk ∪ {rk}, Ek) is the subtree of G rooted at rk
(ii) 〈S1, . . . , Sp〉 is a partition of the vertex set N.
Proposition 3.4
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(i) Let S = 〈G1, . . .Gp〉 be a partition of G into subtrees. Then
p∏
k=1
core(cGk) ⊆ core(cG) (6)
where (Sk, cGk) is the cost game corresponding to the restricted maintenance
problem Gk = 〈Gk, ck, Sk〉.
(ii) Let x be a core element for cG . Then there is a unique finest partition S =
〈G1, . . .Gp〉 of G into subtrees such that x ∈
∏p
k=1 core(cGk).
Proof Let x = (y1, . . . , yp) be an element of
∏p


















Then, according to Proposition 3.1 we need only prove that x(T ) ≤ c(T ) for each
trunk T . Let T be a trunk of G. For any k = 1, . . . , p, let T k be the set of vertices
T ∩ Sk. Then T k ∪ {rk} is a trunk of Gk = (Sk ∪ {rk}, Ek) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , p}

















This proves the first part, (i).
For the proof of (ii), let x be a vector of cost shares. Then, a trunk T will be referred
to as an autonomous trunk at x if and only if x(T ) = c(T ). We claim that there is a
unique minimal autonomous trunk at x (with respect to inclusion). Since V itself is
an autonomous trunk we need only to prove that the intersection of two autonomous
trunks (which is obviously a trunk) is autonomous. The unique minimal autonomous
trunk at x will then be the intersection of all autonomous trunks at x. Let T1, T2 be
two autonomous trunks at x, then
x(T1 ∩ T2) ≤ c(T1 ∩ T2) = cG(T1 ∩ T2) ≤ cG(T1) + cG(T2)− cG(T1 ∪ T2) =
= x(T1) + x(T2)− cG(T1 ∪ T2) ≤ x(T1) + x(T2)− x(T1 ∪ T2) =
= x(T1 ∩ T2).
The second inequality follows from (N, cG) being a concave game, while the re-
maining ones are core inequalities. So x(T1 ∩ T2) = c(T1 ∩ T2) and our claim is
8
proved.
So, let T1 be the unique minimal autonomous trunk at x (which exists by the
above claim). Then, define G1 = (S1 ∪ {r1}, E1) to be the subtree generated by T1
(S1 = T1 \{r} and r1 = r ). Obviously, x1 = (xi)i∈S1 is a core element of (N, cG1).
Let l(T1) be the set of outgoing arcs of T1. Let e = (i, j) be an arc in l(T1). Consider
the branch Be = (Ve, Ee) rooted at e. Then, xe = (xj)j∈Ve\{i} is a core element of


















Let T e be a trunk of Be. Then, T e ∪ T1 is a trunk of G, thus









Therefore, according to Proposition 3.1, xe is a core element of the restricted
problem.
Now, apply the previous reasoning to xe as a core element of (N, cGe). Define
G2 = (S2 ∪ {r2}, E2) to be the subtree generated by T2 (S2 = T2 \ {i} and r2 = i
if e = (i, j) ), where T2 is the unique minimal autonomous trunk at xe of Be.
Then, select any outgoing arc of T2 and repeat the previous reasoning until the
corresponding autonomous trunk T ∗ were such that l(T ∗) = ∅. Then, go down
selecting the outgoing arcs which have not been selected previously. The process
finishes when all the arcs have been selected and the collection of subtrees obtained
at the end satisfies the desired conditions. 2
Let x be a core element, then we refer to the partitionS which satisfies the conditions
of Proposition 3.4 (ii) as the partition into subtrees induced by x.
Example 3.5 Consider the 10 player connection problem as is graphically depicted
in Figure 1. The different vertices are depicted as circles. Each of the encircled
numbers corresponds to a the location of the corresponding player. The special
vertex, the source, is depicted by the triangle below. Furthermore, the arcs in
the treenetwork are represented by the line segments connecting the different




























The partition into subtrees induced by the core element x =
(2, 2, 2, 4, 3, 3, 4, 4, 6, 3) corresponds to the partition of the player set
〈{1, 2, 3}, {4, 7, 8}, {5}, {6, 10}, {9}〉. Note that player 2 plays the role of the
source for both the connection problems induced by the player sets {1, 2, 3} and
{5} respectively. We stress, that he is not considered as a player in either case.
The same counts for the players 3 and 6, who are now the local sources for
the problems associated with the player sets {6, 10} and {9} respectively, but
neither of them are included as a player in the description of the corresponding
connection problems.
We conclude this section with a geometric study of the core. This study is based
on the properties of the core of convex (concave) games (Shapley (1971), Ichiishi
(1983), Monderer, Samet and Shapley (1992)). Because it is concave, the game
corresponding to a maintenance problem has a full dimensional core. (Shapley
(1971)). We show that the core has but two types of faces: faces associated
to nontrivial partitions into subtrees, which we refer to as faces of type I, and
faces associated to groups of players who are paying nothing, which we refer to
as faces of type II. From Monderer et al. (1992) it follows that if (N, v) is a
concave game, then for each σ = 〈S1, . . . , Sp〉, ordered partition of N , the set
Fσ = {x ∈ core(v) | x(∪kl=1Sl) = v(∪
k
l=1Sl) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ p} is a nonempty
face of core(v) of dimension n− k at most.
Lemma 3.6 An allocation x is in the face of core(cG) if and only if x verifies one
of the following conditions:
(I) There exists an autonomous trunk T 6= V at x
(II) x(T ) < c(T ) for all nontrivial trunks T and there exists a nonempty
coalition S ⊆ N \ {i ∈ N | i is a leaf } such that x(S) = 0.
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Proof 1) Let S(x) = 〈G1, . . . Gp〉, where Gl = (Sl ∪ {rl}, El) for all l = 1, . . . p,
be the partition of G into subtrees induced by x.
If x verifies condition (I), then S(x) is a nontrivial partition and x belongs to
the nonempty face of core(cG) defined as Fσ = {x ∈ core(cG) | x(∪kl=1Sl) =
cG(∪kl=1Sl) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ p} where σ = 〈S1, . . . Sp〉 is the ordered partition of
the player set N defined by S(x).
If x verifies condition (II), then x(N \ S) = x(N) = cG(N) = cG(N \ S),
therefore x belongs to the nonempty face of core(cG) defined as Fσ = {x ∈
core(cG) | x(∪kl=1Tl) = cG(∪
k
l=1Tl) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ 2} where σ = 〈T1, T2〉 is the
ordered partition of the player set N defined as T1 = N \ S and T2 = S.
2) Now we will show that if x does not satisfy neither (I) nor (II) then x is in the
relative interior of core(cG). Let L 6= N be a nonempty coalition. Then we claim
that x(L) < cG(L). Denote by TL the trunk {i ∈ N | ∃ j ∈ L such that j  i}.
Then two cases are possible.
Case 2.1. : If TL 6= N , then x(L) ≤ x(TL) < c(TL) = cG(L) , where the
first inequality follows from x ≥ 0, according to Proposition 3.1 and the second one
follows from the negation of (I).
Case 2.2. : If TL = N , then L contains all the leafs of the tree and N \ L 6= ∅
is contained in N \ {i ∈ N | i is a leaf }. Therefore, it follows from the negation
of (I) and (II) that x(TL\L) 6= 0. Then, taking into account that x is a nonnegative
vector it holds that x(L) < x(TL) = cG(L). 2
Example 3.7 Let G1 be the subtree defined in Example 3.5. Then, the core of the
cost game (N, cG1) is represented below. Here,
F1 = {x ∈ IR
3 |x3 = 1 , x1 + x2 = 5 , 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 4 , 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 5}




G11 = ({1, 2} ∪ {r}, {e1, e2})
G21 = ({3} ∪ {r2}, {e3}) with r2 = 1
and F2 = {x ∈ IR
3 |x2 = 1 , x1 + x3 = 5 , 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 4 , 0 ≤ x3 ≤ 5} is the




G12 = ({1, 3} ∪ {r}, {e1, e3})
G22 = ({2} ∪ {r2}, {e2}) with r2 = 1
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and F3 = {x ∈ IR
3 |x1 = 0 , x2 + x3 = 6 , 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 5 , 0 ≤ x3 ≤ 5} is a
face of type (II). The below figure shows the core, and in particular its faces,
laying inbedded in the imputation set I(cG) := {x ∈ IR
N |x(N) = cG(N), xi ≤
cG(i) for all i ∈ N}, which is the set of all individually rational and efficient al-
locations for the game cG . Here it equals the convex hull of the vectors (4, 5,−3),































































(0, 1, 5)(−4, 5, 5) (4,−3, 5)




4 Weighted constrained egalitarian allocations and
the core: a dynamic approach
The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) is a solution concept
for TU games which combines commitment for egalitarianism and promotion of
individual interests in a consistent manner. In convex games, it selects the unique
core allocation which Lorenz-dominates all core allocations and can be computed
using a fairly simple algorithm. According to the constrained egalitarian solution
players are treated in a symmetric way. However, in many situations, this seems
unrealistic. For a discussion on examples where lack of symmetry is present, the
reader is referred to Kalai and Samet (1988) and Shapley (1981). In this section
we analyze the constrained egalitarian solution for standard fixed tree connection
problems, as well as weighted generalizations. Asymmetries between players are
represented by a weight vector ω ∈ IRN+ . For any maintenance problem G and
weight vector ω ∈ IRN+ , the weighted constrained egalitarian solution captures the
idea that the vector of proportional cost shares with respect to ω should be chosen
whenever it determines a core element of (N, cG). Throughout this section we will
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fix a maintenance problem G = 〈G, c,N〉. We will restrict ourselves to admissible
vectors of weights with respect to G, i.e. vectors ω ∈ IRN+ such that for all i ∈ N
with c(ei) > 0 there exists a follower j ∈ F (i) of player i with strictly positive
weight, i.e. ωj > 0. The set of all those weights for G is denoted byW(G). The
admissibility condition will express in the sequel no more than the idea that for
any arc of the tree there is at least one user that can be held responsible for the
corresponding cost.
In order to adapt Dutta and Ray’s algorithm, we need a few definitions. Let T
be a trunk. Suppose we make the following changes to G. First remove all vertices
in T together with the source r, and all arcs in E that are incident to at least one
player in T . Instead, create a new source rT and new arcs (i, rT ) for all agents
i ∈ N\T for which ei is an outgoing arc of T in G. The rest of the tree remains
unchanged. As a result of these steps of cutting the trunk, discarding it and bundling
the remaining branches together, we get a new (contracted) treeGT . A cost function
cT on the set of the corresponding set of arcs ET is defined as follows. An arc
e ∈ E ∩ ET is as costly as before, cT (e) = c(e), while the cost of an arc of type
(i, rT ) is given by cT ((i, rT )) = c(ei). Then the contraction of G by T is defined
by the triple GT = 〈GT , cT , N\T 〉. Note that though GT fails standardness, in the
sense that in general there is more than one arc connected with the source, it has
all other characteristics of a maintenance problem . But this assumption will not
be of importance for our results; we remind the reader of the fact that concavity of
the game (N, cGT ) can be achieved without it. This follows from the possibility of
decomposing the game as is pointed out in the footnote in Section 2.
Define for ω ∈ W(G) the weight of a coalition S ⊆ N as ωS :=
∑
i∈S ωi. The







if ωS > 0
∞ if ωS = 0.
Definition Let ω ∈ W(G). Then, the ω-constrained egalitarian solution is defined




Initialize by letting k = 0 and G0 = G.
STEP 1
Let k = k + 1 . Define µk = min
{
αω(T ) | T is a trunk of Gk−1
}
to be the
minimum weighted average cost under Gk−1 (w.r.t ω). Let Tk(ω) ⊆ Nk−1 be the
unique maximal trunk of Gk−1 (with respect to inclusion) of minimum weighted
average cost4. Define ξi(ω) = ωiµk for all i ∈ Tk(ω).
STEP 2
If∪kl=1Tl(ω) = N∪{r} , then terminate. Otherwise, define by G
k = 〈Gk, ck, Nk〉
the contraction of Gk−1 by Tk(ω) and repeat Step 1.
Obviously, this process must end after at most m ≤ n stages. Taking into account
the special structure of the maintenance problem , the above algorithm yields the
constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray in case of ωi = 1, for all i ∈ N .
Let T (ω) = 〈T1(ω), . . . , Tp(ω)〉 define the partition of the player set induced by the
algorithm. Then














for all i ∈ Tl(ω) , j ∈ Ts(ω) and l < s. (11)
Example 4.2 Let G = 〈G, c,N〉 be the maintenance problem of Example 3.5 and
ω ∈ W(G) such that ωi = 1 for all i ∈ N . Then, the constrained egalitarian
allocation for that problem is ξ(ω) = (2, 2, 2, 4, 3, 3, 4, 4, 6, 3). In the first step
we determine µ1 = 2, T1(ω) = {1, 2, 3} and ξi(ω) = 2 for all i ∈ T1(ω). The




























µ2 = 3, T2(ω) = {5, 6, 10},
ξi(ω) = 3 for all i ∈ T2(ω)
4Observe that the existence of Tk(ω) follows from the concavity of the cost game.
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µ3 = 4, T3(ω) = {4, 7, 8},


















µ4 = 6, T4(ω) = {9},
ξi(ω) = 6 for all i ∈ T4(ω)
Observe that T (ω) can be refined obtaining a partition of G into subtrees in such
a way that the restriction of ξ(ω) to each subtree turns out to be the egalitarian
allocation for the restricted problem. For this example, such a partition into subtrees
is that one described in Example 3.5.
Now we give an algorithm for calculating any ω-constrained egalitarian alloca-
tion by means of taking a dynamic approach. Consider a maintenance problem
G = 〈G, c,N〉. Interpret the vertices as the villages of the different players and the
arcs as the roads to the capital city of the region (source). The cost of a road is
expressed as the number of days it takes (for one person) to paint the stripes on the
road. The constrained egalitarian solution is determined as the time that each of the
residents are painting provided that (i) every worker keeps working as long as the
road from the capital to his residence has not been completed, (ii) every worker does
his job on an unfinished segment between the capital and his home village, (iii) each
worker starts painting at the same moment and (iv) all workers paint equally fast.5
For any vector of admissible weights ω, the ω-constrained egalitarian solution is
obtained by just prescribing different speeds to the workers, ωi for player i. Instead
of the individual time expenses, the cost share now is determined by the distance
that an agent covers until his path is entirely painted. In this way, once players get to
work in some group at one and the same road, each of them is charged for the fraction
of the incurred cost corresponding to painting the unfinished part that is proportional
to his weight. Due to the way of distributing costs we will interpret the weights as
contribution rates. We will see that this dynamic approach amounts to calculating
the individual cost shares in a finite number of stages; each of the different stages
5Our approach resembles the painting story as in Maschler et al. (1995), which resulted in an
algorithm for calculating the nucleolus corresponding to a standard fixed tree game. Only, in our
setting we can do without the social obligation condition.
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corresponds to the actual status of the work procedings at the very moments that
stripes on a specific road are realized. First we formally describe the algorithm and
we prove its validity for calculating weighted constrained egalitarian allocations.
Then we show that for any given fixed tree connection problem G = 〈G, c,N〉,
the set of all ω-constrained egalitarian allocations ξ(ω) when ω varies over W(G)
equals the core of the associated cost game (N, cG). Once established this equiva-
lence, we will study the properties of the map ξG :W(G)→ core(cG), which assigns
to each vector of contribution ratesω the home-down allocation ξ(ω) associated to it.
For a coalitionS and admissible weightω its total weight is defined byωS =
∑
i∈S ωi.
Let x(e, k) ∈ [0, c(e)] be the part of the cost of arc ewhich is paid before stage k. Let
Ek ⊆ E be the subset of arcs whose cost is covered at stage k and letE(k) = ∪j<kEj
be the subset of arcs which have been paid before stage k. Let e(i, k) be the arc
to which player i contributes in stage k and let S(e, k) = {i ∈ N | e(i, k) = e} be
the set of players contributing to arc e in stage k. Let K(i) denote the first stage in
which i stops contributing.
Definition Let x(ω) be the allocation obtained at the end of the algorithm. We will





x(e, 1) = 0 for all e ∈ E
E(1) = ∅
e(i, 1) = ei for all i ∈ N
S(ei, 1) = {i} for all i ∈ N
STEP 1 :
Given the contribution rates of the players contributing to an unfinished arc
e ∈ E \ E(k) in stage k, it would take t(e, k) =
c(e)− x(e, k)
ωS(e,k)
units of time to
finish paying for the arc e. Then, the shortest time needed to finish paying for an
unfinished arc is considered to determine which fraction of each unfinished arc
is constructed. That is, let t(k) = min{t(e, k) | e ∈ E \ E(k)}, then ωS(e,k)t(k)
is the fraction of an unfinished arc e ∈ E \ E(k) which is constructed at stage
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k. Thus, the part of the cost of arc e which is paid before stage k + 1 is given
by x(e, k + 1) = x(e, k) + ωS(e,k)t(k) for all e ∈ E \ E(k). Then, each player
whose path has not been covered yet is charged according to his/her contribution
rate. Let Ek = {e ∈ E \ E(k) | t(e, k) = t(k)} be the subset of arcs whose cost
is covered at stage k. Let E(k + 1) = E(k) ∪ Ek be the subset of arcs which
have been paid before stage k + 1.
STEP 2 : Stop criterium.
If E(k + 1) = E , then terminate. Let K(i) = k be the finishing time for all
players in S(e, k), for all e ∈ Ek. Then, the home-down allocation associated
to ω is xi(ω) =
∑K(i)
k=1 ωit(k) for all i ∈ N . Otherwise, let e ∈ Ek be an arc
whose cost has been paid at stage k. If e′ ∈ E(k+ 1) for all e′  e, then the final
allocation for a player i who has made a contribution to arc e at stage k is xi(ω).
Then, let K(i) = k be the finishing time for all players in S(e, k) .
If there is an arc e′  e whose cost has not been paid yet, then all players in
S(e, k) start contributing to the arc e′ /∈ E(k + 1) preceding arc e which is
closest to e. Then, calculate the set of players that start paying for e at stage
k + 1, S(e, k + 1). Let k = k + 1 and repeat Step 1.
Clearly, the algorithm is well defined, i.e. it stops after at most K ≤ n stages.
Let x(ω) be the home-down allocation associated to ω ∈ W(G), then the following
properties are satisfied.
(C1) If ei  ej, then K(i) ≤ K(j), that is, players closer to the source stop
contributing earlier.







(C3) Let Ak(ω) = { i ∈ N | K(i) = k }. Then, ∪j≤kAj(ω) ∪ {r} is a trunk of G
for all k = 1, . . . , K.
(C4) xi(ω) = ωi
c(Ak(ω))
ωAk(ω)
for all i ∈ Ak(ω).
Observe that some sets in the ordered tuple 〈A1(ω), . . . , AK(ω)〉 can be emp-
ty if no player has stopped paying at that stage. In the sequel we will refer to
〈A1(ω), . . . , AK(ω)〉 as the partition defined by the finishing time induced by x(ω).
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Example 4.4 The next example shows how the algorithm works. Let G = 〈G, c,N〉
be the maintenance problem defined in Example 3.5. Then, the home-down
allocation associated to ω with ωi = 1 for all i ∈ N , is calculated as follows.
At stage k = 1, x(ei, 1) = 0 , S(ei, 1) = {i} and t(ei, 1) = c(ei) for all i ∈ N .
Then, t(1) = 1 , E1 = {e2, e3} and E(2) = E1. Let k = 2, then
i x(ei, 2) S(ei, 2) t(ei, 2)
1 1 {1, 2, 3} 1
2 1
3 1
4 1 {4} 5
5 1 {5} 2
6 1 {6} 3
7 1 {7} 2
8 1 {8} 2
9 1 {9} 5
10 1 {10} 1
Thus, t(2) = 1 , E2 = {e1, e10} and E(3) = {e1, e2, e3, e10}. Therefore, K(1) =
K(2) = K(3) = 2. Let k = 3, then




4 2 {4} 4
5 2 {5} 1
6 2 {6, 10} 1
7 2 {7} 1
8 2 {8} 1
9 2 {9} 4
10 2
Thus, t(3) = 1 , E3 = {e5, e6, e7, e8} and E(4) = {e1, e2, e3, e5, e6, e7, e8, e10}.
Therefore, K(5) = K(6) = K(10) = 3. Let k = 4, then
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9 3 {9} 3
10 2
Thus, t(4) = 1 , E4 = {e4} and E(5) = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6, e7, e8, e10}. There-
fore, K(4) = 4. Let k = 5, then t(5) = 2 , E5 = {e9} and E(6) = E. Thus,
K(9) = 5 and x(ω) = (2, 2, 2, 4, 3, 3, 4, 4, 6, 3).
Proposition 4.5 Letω ∈ W(G), then the home-down allocation x(ω) coincides with
the ω-constrained egalitarian allocation.
Proof Take ω ∈ W(G) and let T (ω) = 〈T1(ω), . . . , Tp(ω)〉 be the ordered par-
tition of the player set associated to ξ(ω), where ξ(ω) is the ω-constrained egali-
tarian allocation. Then, we claim that T (ω) coincides with the ordered partition
〈A1(ω), . . . , AK(ω)〉 defined by the finishing times induced by the home-down al-
location x(ω).
The first nonempty set in 〈A1(ω), . . . , AK(ω)〉, A1(ω), equals the maximum trunk
of G which is constructed fastest. Then, taking into account that the time needed to
construct any trunk T of G is given by αω(T ) =
c(T )
ω(T )
, it holds that T1(ω) = A1(ω)
and therefore xi(ω) = ξi(ω) for all i ∈ T1(ω) = A1(ω). Then contract G by T1(ω).
But 〈Ai+1(ω), . . . , AK(ω)〉 is, respectively, the ordered partition of the player set
induced by both allocations for the contracted problem. Thus, repeated application
of the previous reasoning to each contracted problem yields the claim. 2
We stress that different vectors of contribution rates may yield the same weighted
constrained egalitarian solution. Take ω ∈ W(G) and letA = 〈A1(ω), . . . , AK(ω)〉
be the partition of the player set induced by ξ(ω). For ω′ ∈ W(G) the home-down
allocation x(w′) coincides with ξ(ω) precisely when the two following conditions
are satisfied: 1) the partition of the player set induced by x(ω′) is equal to A and
2) within each of the components of A, the players must have the same relative
weight. The latter condition is reflected by the statement that for each A ∈ A there
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is a positive number λA with ω′A = λAωA.
So if for all k ∈ N we define I(k) as the number such that k ∈ AI(k)(ω), then
a sufficient condition (though not necessary) for ω′ in order to have the equality






whenever AI(i)(ω)  AI(j)(ω).
Remark Notice that the above algorithm provides a way of calculating weighted
constrained egalitarian solutions in polynomial time; its complexity is O(|N |2).
We now are finished with all preparations for the main result in this section.
Theorem 4.6 The core of the game cG equals the set of all weighted constrained
egalitarian allocations of G, ξ(W(G)).
Proof According to Algorithm 4.3 and Proposition 3.3 we have ξ(W(G)) ⊆
core(cG). Conversely, let x be a core element. Then we have to show that there
exists ω ∈ W(G) for which ξ(ω) = x. Let S = 〈G1, . . . , Gp〉 be the partition into
subtrees induced by x (Proposition 3.4), then two cases are possible:
Case (i) : If S is the trivial partition S = 〈G〉, define ωi = xi for each player i ∈ N .
In such a case,




Therefore, ξi(ω) = ωiαω(N) = xi for all i ∈ N .
Case (ii) : IfS = 〈G1, . . . , Gp〉, whereGk = (Sk∪{rk}, Ek) for each k = 1, . . . , p,
is a nontrivial partition , then consider the precedence relation over 〈S1, . . . , Sp〉
defined as follows,
Sl  St ⇔ ∃ i ∈ Sl such that St ⊆ F (i).
Then, define ωi = αlxi for each player i ∈ Sl, for all l = 1, . . . , p , with
α = (α1, . . . , αp) being a strictly positive vector (αl > 0 for all l) which satisfies
that αl ≥ αt for all l, t such that Sl  St. Then, we will show that ξ(ω) = x.
Because our choice of α it holds that if Sl precedes St, then the cost of Sl
(
∑
i∈Sl c(ei) ) is covered by the players in Sl before the cost of St (
∑
i∈St c(ei) )












all l = 1, . . . , p, there must exists St and i, j ∈ St such that
ξi(ω) < xi and ξj(ω) > xj. (12)
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By condition (C2) satisfied by ξ(ω) = x(ω), player i stops paying before player
j at the home-down allocation ξ(ω), i.e., K(i) < K(j). Let Ft(j) = {r ∈
St | j  r}, i.e., the set of followers of j in St. It follows from condition (C1)
that i /∈ Ft(j). Moreover, since it must be K(j) ≤ K(r) for all r ∈ Ft(j), then
ξr(ω) ≥ xr for all r ∈ Ft(j). Let now j∗ be the nearest player to the root on the
path P (j) who stops paying at the same stage as player j. Then







Since ξj(ω) > xj, then it follows from (13) that ξj∗(ω) > xj∗ . Then, following
the same argument as before,
ξr(ω) ≥ xr for each r ∈ Ft(j
∗). (14)
Let S−t be the union of all sets in 〈S1, . . . , Sp〉 which strictly precede Sl, then
S−t , S
−
t ∪ St are autonomous trunks at ξ(ω). Let i∗ = π(j∗), i.e. the predecessor
of player j∗, then i∗ is not the root because i /∈ Ft(j∗) and G is a standard tree
and, since nobody in Ft(j∗) contributes to any arc on the path P (i∗) 6= ∅ at the
allocation ξ(ω), then S−t ∪ (St \ Ft(j


































violating the core constraint corresponding to the trunk S−t ∪ (St \ Ft(j
∗)). 2
Remark Aadland and Kolpin (1997) have introduced a solution concept for fixed
tree problems when the tree is a chain, the restricted average cost share rule, which
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turns out to be the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989).
Remark The parametric class of solutions for standard fixed tree problems in-
troduced by van Gellekom and Potters (1997) contains the constrained egalitarian
solution as an extreme.
5 The constrained egalitarian solution as a cost shar-
ing mechanism
In this section we consider the class of maintenance problems corresponding to a
fixed set of agents N and a fixed tree network G = (V,E). The class of all cost
functions c : E → IR+ is denoted by C. A cost sharing mechanism is a mapping
ξ : C → IRN+ , relating each cost function c ∈ C to a vector of cost shares ξ(c) ∈ IR
N
+ .
The constrained egalitarian rule is defined to be the cost sharing mechanism ξe
which assigns to each c ∈ C the constrained egalitarian solution ξe(G, c,N) for
G = 〈G, c,N〉. Analogously, for ω ∈ W(G) the ω-constrained egalitarian mecha-
nism is defined to be the cost sharing mechanism ξω which assigns to each c ∈ C the
corresponding ω-constrained egalitarian solution for G = 〈G, c,N〉. But we will
focus only on the constrained egalitarian cost sharing mechanism; a treatment of the
generalized class of all weighted constrained egalitarian cost sharing mechanisms
is postponed to the Appendix.
Suppose that, given the cost function c ∈ C, the arcs in E get (weakly) more
expensive. Then, consistently, a reasonable cost sharing mechanism will increase
(weakly) all the individual cost shares. Nobody should benefit from an increase of
cost of the entire network. When a cost sharing mechanism ξ is consistent with this
idea, then it is called cost monotonic. More formally, ξ is cost monotonic iff for all
c, c′ ∈ C, c′ ≥ c implies ξ(c′) ≥ ξ(c). Furthermore, if a cost sharing mechanism ξ
generates only stable outcomes in the sense that ξ(c) ∈ core(cG) for G = 〈G, c,N〉
and all c ∈ C, then it is said to satisfy the core property. It is clear from the dynamic
approach described in the previous section that the (weighted) constrained egalitar-
ian rule satisfies both above properties.
Let 〈T1, . . . , Tp〉 be the partition of the player set N associated to ξe(c) induced
by Algorithm 4.1. Let t(i) be the number such that i ∈ Tt(i). Then conditions (9),
(10) and (11) can be rewritten as follows:
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ξei (c) = ξ
e








c(ei) for all k = 1, . . . , p (16)
where T (k) is the trunk of G defined as ∪kl=1Tl.
Theorem 5.1 The constrained egalitarian cost share rule is the unique cost share
rule which minimizes the range of the cost shares among those rules satisfying
cost monotonicity and core property.
Proof 1) The constrained egalitarian rule minimizes the range of cost shares among
the rules verifying cost monotonicity and the core property. Certainly, let ϕ be any
cost share mechanism satisfying those properties, then we will show that for all
c ∈ C the following inequalities are satisfied:
max{ϕi(c) | i ∈ N } ≥ max{ ξ
e
i (c) | i ∈ N } (17)
min{ϕi(c) | i ∈ N } ≤ min{ ξ
e
i (c) | i ∈ N } (18)
where ξe(c) is the constrained egalitarian solution of G = 〈G, c,N〉.
On the contrary, suppose that inequality (17) is not satisfied. Then condition (15)
implies
max{ϕj(c) | j ∈ Tp } < ξ
e
i (c) for all i ∈ Tp.










where T (p − 1) is the trunk ∪p−1l=1 Tl, contradicting the core property. Then (17)
holds. A similar reasoning gives inequality (18).
2) We next establish uniqueness. Let ϕ be any cost allocation rule satisfying
cost monotonicity and core property such that range(ϕ(c)) = range(ξe(c)) for all
c ∈ C. We will prove that ϕi(c) = ξei (c) for all i ∈ Tk and for all k = 1, . . . , p by
backward induction on the index k.
If range(ϕ(c)) = range(ξe(G, c,N)) , then in view of inequalities (17) and (18) it
has to be max{ϕi(c) | i ∈ N } = max{ ξei (c) | i ∈ N }. Therefore, ϕi(c) ≤ ξ
e
i (c)







which contradicts the core property. Thus, ϕi(c) = ξei (c) for all i ∈ Tp. Suppose
that ϕi(c) = ξei (c) for all i ∈ Tl , for all l = k, . . . , p.
Let 〈T1, . . . , Tp〉 be the partition of the player set N associated to ξe(c) induced by
Algorithm 4.1. Suppose that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}, we lower the cost of an










The costs of other arcs remain the same. Let ck : E → IR be the function that gives
for each arc the remaining cost. We claim that 〈G, ck, N〉 defines a maintenance
problem , such that 〈T k1 , . . . , T
k
k 〉 with T
k
l = Tl for all l ≤ k − 1 and T
k
k = ∪l≥kTl
defines the partition of the player set N induced by ξe(ck) and in addition
ξei (c






for all i ∈ Tl and l ≥ k + 1.
(21)
This claim is verified as follows. Let ϕ be the cost allocation defined by the right-
hand side in the above expression (21). Then we have to show that ϕ = ξe(ck).
First, we will show that ϕ is a core element of (N, cGk). First of all note that ϕi ≥ 0

























where the second equality follows from condition (16). Then, according to Propo-





k(ei) for all trunks T . Let T
be any trunk of G, then we are left two cases,












Case (ii) : T ∩ (∪l>kTl) 6= ∅ , then T = T ′ ∪ T ′′, where T ′ = T ∩ (∪l≤kTl) and
























































Thus, combining expressions (22), (23) and (24) and taking into account the fact



































Now we will show that the partition generated by Algorithm 4.1 for calculat-
ing the constrained egalitarian solution of Gk coincides with the ordered partition
〈T k1 , . . . , T
k

















where the first inequality follows from the fact of ϕ being a core element of (N, cGk).
Therefore, the average cost (with respect to ck) of T1 = T k1 is minimum. Now re-
peated application of the previous reasoning to each contracted problem yields the
claim (observe that ϕ1 = (ϕi)i∈N\T1 is a core element for the contracted problem as
it was shown in the proof of Proposition 3.4). So this proves our claim.
So for ck−1 as defined above, it is verified that
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(i) ck−1 ≤ c
(ii) ξei (c) = ξ
e
i (c
k−1) for all i ∈ Tl and all l ≤ k − 1
(iii) ϕi(ck−1) = ξei (c
k−1) for all i ∈ Tl for all l ≥ k − 1.
Observe that condition (iii) follows from the fact that 〈T k−11 , . . . , T
k−1
k−1 〉 with
T k−1k−1 = ∪l≥k−1Tl is the partition of the player set associated to ξ
e(ck−1) gener-
ated by Algorithm 4.1 (see the above claim) and the application of the previous













































Therefore, together with expressions (25) and (26), cost monotonicity implies
ϕi(c) = ϕi(ck−1) for all i ∈ T (k − 1). But then the above conditions (i) and
(ii) imply ϕi(c) = ξei (c) for all i ∈ Tk−1. 2
Suppose that getting connected is equally valued by the different agents. Then the
constrained egalitarian cost share mechanism minimizes the range of cost shares
among the class of cost monotonic mechanisms sharing the core property, simul-
taneously it maximizes Rawlsian welfare, that is measured by the opposite of the
highest cost share. In fact, it is the only cost monotonic mechanism under this
welfare consideration.
Theorem 5.2 The constrained egalitarian cost share mechanism is the unique cost
share mechanism that maximizes Rawlsian welfare among those mechanisms that
satisfy cost monotonicity and which satisfy the core property.
Proof The proof resembles that of Theorem 5.1 up to a high degree. First, the
constrained egalitarian cost share mechanism selects the Lorenz maximal element
in the core of a maintenance problem (Dutta and Ray (1989)), which implies Rawl-
sian maximality. Suppose ϕ satisfies also cost monotonicity and the core property
therebye maximizing Rawlsian welfare. Then of course by assumption for any
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c ∈ C, max{ϕi(c) | i ∈ N} = max{ξei (c) | i ∈ N}. Now proceed along the same
lines as in the proof of Theorem 5.1 after ‘2)’ in order to see that ϕ equals ξe. 2
In fact, the characterization results of the constrained egalitarian cost sharing mech-
anism for trees are similar to those for the restrictive average rule for chains as
in Aadland and Kolpin (1997). Besides the fact that our results hold for a more
general setting, Aadland and Kolpin needed an additional characterizing property
which is satisfied by the constrained egalitarian cost share mechanism. The property
in question is ranking, which requires that an agent with higher stand alone costs,
should contribute (weakly) more.
One can trace easily the following independencies between the properties that we
used above. Splitting the total costs equally between the players gives a cost
monotonic mechanism that minimizes both the range of the weighted cost shares
and the maximal weighted cost share. But the allocation need not be a core el-
ement. Furthermore there are mechanisms ξ that minimize the range of the cost
shares subject to the core property but are not cost monotonic. A legitimate can-
didate would be the mechanism ξ that coincides with the constrained egalitari-
an solution for all problems except for the following 4-player problem in which




mechanism that relates each cost function c ∈ C to the corresponding Shapley value
for cG with G = 〈G, c,N〉, defines a cost monotonic mechanism for which the core
property is satisfied, however it does not always minimize the range of cost shares
or minimize the maximal cost share.
6 Weighted Shapley values and the core
In Section 4 we explained that each weighted constrained egalitarian allocation is a
home-down allocation. Suppose that we systematically reverse the assignment rule
in each step of the above allocation procedure and that in each step we first assign
each of the disconnected players to the furthest unfinished arc on his path, which
is the one that is closest to the source. Next, like before, each arc that becomes
selected in this way is constructed by the agents assigned to it, and each agent i
pays part of the incurred cost proportional to his weight ωi. Repeat these steps
until all players have the desired connections. As a result we get a vector of cost
shares by this bottom-up procedure, which will be called the down-home allocation
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corresponding to the vector of weights ω.
For instance, consider Example 3.5 with equally weighted players. Then in order to
determine the corresponding down-home allocation, we first assign all players to e1.
Then this arc is constructed and the corresponding costs are shared proportionally




each agent. At the second step the agents in {2, 4, 5, 7, 8} and {3, 6, 9, 10} resp. are
assigned to e2 and e3 resp. Agent 1 reached his home in this first step and does not
contribute anymore. Next the procedure requires that agents in {3, 6, 9, 10} each
pay 1
4
and agents in {2, 4, 5, 7, 8} pay 1
5
. Now the agents 2 and 3 are satisfied and








respectively. At the beginning of the
following step the players go on constructing, player 5 is situated at e5, players 4,7
and 8 at e4 and players 3,6,9 and 10 stick to e3. This boils down to the additional
payments of 3 for player 5, 2 for each of the players 4, 7, 8 and 4
3
for each player






respectively. The last step consists of letting each agent i ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10}
construct it’s own indispensible arc ei at the cost of an additional payment c(ei).








for agent 7, 8, 9 and 10
respectively. It is widely known that the resulting allocation is nothing else than the
Shapley value of the corresponding game cG .
In general, for any maintenance problem G = 〈G, c,N〉, if we determine indi-
vidual payments according to the above procedure with respect to an admissible
vector of weights ω, we get as a result the weighted Shapley value for cG , that
corresponds to the weight system (ω̃, 〈N\T, T 〉) where T = {i ∈ N |ωi > 0}
and ω̃ ∈ IRN++ is such that ω̃T = ωT and ω̃N\T is arbitrarily chosen. For a more
detailed discussion of weighted Shapley values we refer the reader to Kalai and
Samet (1992). It is not difficult to see that by varying over all admissible weights,
the corresponding set of weighted Shapley values does in fact not exhaust the core
of the game cG . Below we describe how in a natural way the admissibility condition
on weights can be relaxed, yielding down-home allocations each corresponding to
some weighted Shapley value. Then with Monderer et al. (1992) in mind, it turns
out that this extended class of allocations equals the core of cG .
Take a weight vector ω ∈ IRN+ , ω 6= 0. Without admissibility condition on ω,
we can actually take the same steps as in the above algorithm as long as arcs be-
come selected that are used by at least one user i with strictly positive weight ωi.
Suppose that ω is not admissible for G. Then by consequetively constructing arcs
in each branch with at least one user with non-zero weight and doing nothing in all
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other branches, we end up with disconnected branches with all players of weight
0. Suppose the latter is the case, and let N1 be the union of all players that are
still disconnected after these operations. If we have additional exogeneously given
information, that consists of a weight vector ω1 ∈ IRN1+ \{0}, prescribing the relative
impact of a player i ∈ N1 compared to the others in N1, then consistently we could
proceed by applying the above techniques to the subproblems induced by each of
the branches with the individual weights as in ω1. Again the process terminates
prematurely when the restriction of ω1 to one of these branches is not admissible
for one the problems induced by it. Then define N2 as the set of those players in
N1 that are still not connected. Then we could proceed for those agents if only we
have the disposal of another weight vector ω2 ∈ IRN2+ \{0}, which is to summarize
the relative impact of the remaining players in N2. Again proceed with ω2 for the
remaining disconnected branches. In this way, by having sufficiently many weight
vectors containing information about the relative impact of players, we end up with
the whole constructed tree and an allocation of the corresponding total cost. Note
that between two terminations of the procedure, we construct connected parts in the
graph each determining a subtree of G; the cost for constructing arcs in such a tree
are distributed among the players located here. If the set of players T of one such
subtree is connected during phase t, i.e. the phase in which ωt was used as a weight
vector, then the restriction to T , wtT , is admissible for the restricted connection
problem induced by the subtree corresponding to T , GT = (T ∪ {rT}, ET ). So the
final allocation for the grand coalition N is determined by down-home allocations
for different subproblems, which form a partition of G into subtrees. This gives rise
to the following extension of the notion of down-home allocations.
Let 〈S1, . . . , Sp〉 be a partition of the player set N that induces a partition
S = 〈G1, . . . , Gp〉 of G into subtrees, such that for each k ∈ {1, . . . p}, Gk is
the tree corresponding to Sk and Gk it’s restricted maintenance problem . Then a
weight vector ω ∈ IRN+ is called admissible for the partition 〈S1, . . . , Sp〉 if for each
k = 1, . . . , p, we have ωSk ∈ W(G
k). Such a weight represents the idea that agents
in Si have impact 0 compared to those in Sj whenever i < j. For each such a
weight ω we define the down-home allocation as the combination of the down-home
allocations for each of the problems Gk corresponding to ωSk .
It is tedious but not very hard to show that each such a down-home allocation
is related in a natural way with a weighted Shapley value of cG . By extending the
class of down-home allocations by enlargening the set of admissible weights we get
all weighted Shapley values of cG . Then following the result of Monderer et al.
(1992), stating that the core equals the set of weighted Shapley values it must be
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that it also equals the set of all down-home allocations.
7 Appendix
Throughout this section, fix a tree networkG = (V,E) and the set of playersN of a
maintenance problem G. Denote by C the class of all cost functions c : E → IR+.
Also, let there be given a (positive) weight system, i.e. a mapping ω : C → IRN+
which relates each cost function c to a (positive) vector of admissible weights for
G = 〈G, c,N〉. Then, the ω-constrained egalitarian mechanism is the cost sharing
mechanism ξω which relates each maintenance problem G = 〈G, c,N〉 with its
ω(c)-constrained egalitarian allocation ξω(c).
Theorem 7.1 Suppose ω is positive. Then ω-constrained egalitarian mechanism











| i ∈ N
}
among those cost mechanisms which are cost monotonic and have the core
property.
Theorem 7.2 The ω-constrained egalitarian cost share mechanism minimizes the




| i ∈ N
}
among those mechanisms
which are cost monotonic and have the core property.
The above two theorems are proved as straightforward adaptation of part 1) of the
proof of Theorem 5.1.
If ω is not a positive weight system then the maximum and the minimum is taken
over the subset of players with strictly positive weight and the class of cost sharing
mechanisms has to be reduced to those mechanisms which have the core property
and verify that ξi(c) = 0 for all i ∈ N such that ωi(c) = 0 for all maintenance
problems G = 〈G, c,N〉. In order to obtain a characterization result which
generalizes the result stated in Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 we have to restrict
ourselves to homogeneous positive weight systems, i.e. weight systems ω that do
not depend on the cost function, or ω(c) = ω(c′) for all c, c′ ∈ C.
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Theorem 7.3 Let ω be a positive homogeneous weight system. Then the ω-
constrained egalitarian rule is the unique cost sharing mechanism which mini-
mizes the weighted range of the cost shares among those mechanisms satisfying
cost monotonicity and the core property.
Theorem 7.4 Let ω be a positive homogeneous weight system. Then the ω-






| i ∈ N,ωi(c) > 0
}
among those mechanisms satisfying cost monotonicity and the core property.
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